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This article examines the relationship between projections of climate change and
the responses to those projections. First, it discusses uncertainty and its role in
shaping not only the production of climate projections but also the use of these
projections by decision makers. We find that uncertainty critically affects the way
climate projections move from useful to usable, where usefulness is defined by
scientists’ perception of users’ needs, and usability is defined by users’ perception
of what knowledge can be readily applied to their decision. From the point of
view of the natural scientist, we pose that there is an uncertainty fallacy, that
is, a belief that the systematic reduction of uncertainty in climate projections is
required in order for the projections to be used by decision makers. Second, we
explore the implications of climate projections for policy and decision making,
using examples from the seasonal climate forecast applications literature as an
analog. We examine constraints and opportunities for their application in policy
and practice and find that over-reliance on science and technical solutions might
crowd out the moral imperative to do what is needed to improve livelihoods
and to guarantee ecosystems’ long-term sustainability. We conclude that, in the
context of high uncertainty, decision makers should not look for ‘perfect’ forecasts,
but seek to implement knowledge systems that integrate climate projections with
other kinds of knowledge and that consider the multiple stressors that shape their
decision environment.  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Clim Change 2010 1 670–682
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergov-ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-
AR4) published in 2007 has labeled climate change
‘unequivocal’.1 Yet, despite growing evidence that
the climate is changing, there is still a significant
uncertainty regarding how people, ecosystems, and
structures will experience these changes. Part of the
problem remains in the high level of uncertainty sur-
rounding the projections of the changes in the physical
climate of the Earth for the coming decades, including
how much and how quickly the Earth will warm,
sea level will rise, and the weather will change. This
uncertainty varies both across scales (geographical
and temporal) and across systems (human, environ-
mental, and physical). Because the consequences of
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these changes can be devastating to social, biological,
and physical systems worldwide, there is great moti-
vation on the part of decision makers, in both the
public and private sectors, to acquire and understand
information that can inform their decisions. Despite
evidence that policy makers often act under great lev-
els of uncertainty in many policy areas,2–4 there is
relatively little empirical evidence of how they use
climate predictionsa and with what results. Although
the focus on improving predictions and decreasing
uncertainty has been a priority in research-funding
programs, understanding whether this focus increases
use by decision makers has received less attention.5
In the next sections of this article, we explore
three themes frequently explored in the literature
related to the use of climate projections in decision
making:
1. Uncertainty in science is a product of the
research process, and it makes decision
making more complex. In response to users’
perceived needs, scientists have focused on
developing more powerful and scaled-down
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climate predictions; this drive to improve climate
predictions has shaped both atmospheric and
social scientists’ research agendas.
2. Knowledge producers and users often perceive
the usefulness of scientific knowledge differ-
ently, and these diverse perceptions may con-
strain the use of climate projections. Uncertainty
and climate predictions’ lack of skill have been
frequently used to justify policy paralysis and
inaction. One argument is that if preventive
action involves steep costs (both financial and
political), then policy makers are much more
likely to resort to a wait-and-see position.
Implicitly, in these cases, the level of uncer-
tainty is too large in relation to what decision
markers perceive they need. Other obstacles to
practical use of predictions include institutional
mismatch and constraints, competing issues,
lack of resources, and faulty communication.
3. As prediction science matures and both scientists
and decision makers become more aware of
the constraints and possibilities to use climate
projections, a new opportunity for framing their
relationship emerges as they increasingly seek
to interact with each other. This interaction
happens, for example, in the context of scientific
assessments or of policy implementation. In
practice, this interaction may lead decision
makers and scientists to integrate projections
into broader decision environments that include
not only climate but also other stressors affecting
decision making.
Through the discussion of these themes, we
explore the conditions that shape the ways decision
makers use or fail to use climate projections. We then
examine one area of climate-projection application,
namely, the use of seasonal climate forecasts (SCFs).
PROJECTIONS, PREDICTION, AND
THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we discuss the role and implications
of uncertainty in the discovery and use of climate-
related knowledge. In scientific research, uncertainty
is an intrinsic part of the process and a motivator
of research. In fact, the investigation by scientists
of different sources of uncertainty is an important
focus of research. This scientific use of uncertainty as
a research focus stands in contrast to uncertainty as
source of complication for decision making. We briefly
discuss the history and nature of climate projections
in order to explore the role of uncertainty.
The history of climate change as a scientific prob-
lem is much older than its history as a social and public
policy issue. For example, Weart6 points out that the
basic projection that the Earth will warm in the pres-
ence of increasing greenhouse gases relies on physics
that have been known for more than 200 years. Even
before modern computationally based model predic-
tions, global warming was being discussed by scientists
such as Arrhenius,7 Callendar,8 and Budyko.9 The
era of modern climate modeling can be traced to
early models that were able to represent, explicitly,
the transport of heat from equator to poles by the
motions of the atmosphere and oceans.10 However,
the response of the Earth’s weather and climate to
incremental warming by greenhouse gases is compli-
cated by the presence of water as vapor, liquid, or ice,
which contributes to a set of feedback processes that
can either amplify or diminish the initial incremental
warming. This complex response is in sharp contrast
to the simple, underlying physics of greenhouse-gas
warming and the difference in complexity has impor-
tant implications for policy. It has been relatively
easier for scientists to reach a consensus that climate
is changing1 than it has been to inform decision mak-
ers about the specific character and magnitude of those
changes.
The IPCC is the main organization responsible
for the assessment and dissemination of climate
projections based on the scientific literature published
in refereed journals. In a recent review of its standards,
Farber11 argues that the IPCC raises the credibility of
the projections of climate change above the normal
standards of scientific research, endowing them with
enough certainty to have legal standing in the US
judicial system—something economic models have
failed to accomplish so far.
The IPCC-AR4 basic projections of climate
change for the year 2100 are summarized as follows:
1. For the lowest projections of greenhouse-gas
emissions considered, the global average of the
temperature at the surface of the Earth in 2100
will increase between 1.1 and 2.9◦C, and the
global mean sea level will increase between 0.18
and 0.38 m.
2. For the highest emission scenario considered,
the temperature will increase between 2.4 and
6.4◦C, and the global mean sea level will
increase between 0.26 and 0.59 m. Both ranges
of sea level rise predictions, based on lower and
higher emission scenarios, are qualified by the
statement: ‘excluding future dynamical changes
in ice flow’.
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The uncertainty associated with these predic-
tions has important implications for whether and how
they are used in practice. On the one hand, for the
scientist, reduction of uncertainty is often posed as a
motivation for new scientific research. For the user,
on the other hand, uncertainty may act as a constraint
in the use of projections. Uncertainty is also difficult
to define and its quantification difficult to calculate.
In the short and deceptively straightforward summary
above, there are already four different nuances of
uncertainty.
First, the range of temperatures and sea level rise
expresses uncertainties in the prediction of parameters
intrinsic to the physical climate. These uncertainties
can be quantified by comparison of model projections
with observations. They may be directly related to
details of the model construction, for example, the
treatment of clouds and ice sheets. In prediction-
based scientific investigation, the reduction of errors
and, hence uncertainty, is an explicit goal. Second,
the range of greenhouse-gas emissions expresses
uncertainties in our knowledge of the amount of
greenhouse gases that will be emitted due to human
activity. These emissions depend on decisions that
happen outside of the realm of physical science. Third,
the qualification of the sea level rise projections by the
statement ‘excluding future dynamical changes in ice
flow’ expresses the fact that we know that there are
processes in the climate models that are potentially
important and poorly represented or not represented
at all. Finally, Farber’s11 argument discussed above
represents a fourth evaluation of uncertainty, when he
concludes that the IPCC process increases the certainty
of climate projections because its completeness and
openness reduces the possibility of fundamental flaws
in the conclusions of global warming. This type of
judgment by people outside the community of climate
scientists is an important indicator of the robustness of
knowledge. It addresses, with a documented method
of evaluation, whether nonscientists who are users of
the knowledge generated by the scientific investigation
of the Earth’s climate find the information convincing.
These distinct nuances of uncertainty just begin
to span the spectrum of uncertainty that both
scientists and decision makers must face. This wider
spectrum would include, for instance, the uneven and
inconsistent expression of uncertainty by scientists.12
In the study of the Earth’s weather and climate,
predictions are often used to verify the quality of
knowledge and inform the quantification of uncer-
tainty of our understanding, for example, of the
atmosphere. The classic problem is weather predic-
tion, in which a deterministic forecast is made of a set
of environmental parameters. Temperature, pressure,
wind, and rain are predicted for a particular place
and a particular time, and it is possible to verify these
predictions with observations. There are uncertainties
from a variety of sources in weather predictions, and
these are communicated in, for example, probability
of precipitation. Deterministic weather forecasts and
simple statements of probability of precipitation are
attractive to users because they can be easily translated
into a decision. For example, depending on weather
forecasts, users can postpone sporting events or antic-
ipate mowing their lawns. There is, however, more
information about uncertainty than what is expressed
in the simple and direct expression of probability
of precipitation. For example, there are uncertainties
related to known model shortcomings and uncertain-
ties related to errors in the observations that are used
to initiate the forecast. Focusing on what is known
about uncertainty, research strategies that take advan-
tage of this information are possible. One example is
the concept of probabilistic predictions where, rather
than a single deterministic forecast, ensembles of fore-
casts are used. These forecasts are combined with the
idea that, in the least, the random component of the
uncertainty can be reduced.13 In this case, uncertainty
becomes a source of scientific information that pro-
vides a mechanism for improving the forecast, and
potentially, the usability of the forecast. By investi-
gating and managing uncertainty, a better forecast is
generated. On the basis of this scientific practice, sci-
entists have been motivated to provide more detailed
information on uncertainty to increase its use.14,15
These two types of forecasts, probabilistic and
deterministic, provide brackets for the scientist, in that
the deterministic forecast is a specific estimate of what
will happen, and the probabilistic forecast is a range
of what is expected to happen. Weather forecasts are
often called predictions because of their deterministic
nature. Estimates of how the climate will change are
often labeled as projections or assessments, because
deterministic forecasts of climate change are not for-
mally possible.16 However, as discussions of climate
change permeate society, discussions of uncertainty
from a scientific perspective are lost and projection
and prediction become synonymous in practice.12,17
The IPCC report1 recognizes the importance of
communicating uncertainty and discusses its findings
in terms of confidence and likelihood. Confidence is
defined with well-known expressions like very high to
mean 9 out of 10, medium 5 out of 10, etc. Some-
thing is likely to happen means that there is a 66%
probability of occurrence. These statements of uncer-
tainty strive to incorporate the different sources and
types of uncertainty that are suggested in the example
of the IPCC predictions given above.18 Overall, to
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assess uncertainty, scientists draw on ‘the strength and
consistency of the observed evidence, the range and
consistency of model projections, the reliability of par-
ticular models as tested by various methods, and, most
importantly, the body of work addressed in earlier syn-
thesis and assessment reports’(Ref 19, p. 8). In terms
of relative uncertainties, it is safe to say that those asso-
ciated with the projections that the surface of the Earth
will, on average, warm are smaller than the uncertain-
ties related to knowledge of greenhouse-gas emissions
and socioeconomic impacts.20 This is because climate
models are based on physics, which (1) allows for
the investigation of cause and effect, (2) supports
predictions, and (3) can be verified with observa-
tions, whereas different emissions scenarios depend on
contentious international agreements, national-scale
policy implementation, and even social and behav-
ioral norms at smaller scales. The uncertainty related
to known inadequacies, such as those related to the
treatment of ice sheets dynamics in models, indicates
known risks. The role of processes that may be impor-
tant to climate change and impacts but that have not
yet been identified (‘unknown unknowns’) is expected
to add yet another layer of uncertainty to projections.
Regarding IPCC projections, statements con-
cerning average surface warming and sea level rise
are the most robust. The consistency of these projec-
tions from one IPCC report to the next, on one hand,
contributes to confidence that the physical processes
in the models are reasonably represented. On the other
hand, the fact that the range of the projections does
not get smaller with successive reports frustrates the
users of climate projections and the sponsors of cli-
mate research. Finally, as the spatial and temporal
specificity of a projection increases, uncertainty also
increases.
We are left, therefore, with daunting complex-
ity in the quantification and specification of scientific
uncertainty. We can conclude ‘unequivocally’ that the
Earth’s surface will warm due to increasing anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gases. We can say, with similar
confidence, that this may, for example, contribute to
the melting of ice sheets, which, in turn, increases the
risk of disruption to humans through rising sea level.
Hence, we can assess the uncertainty well enough to
know we need to reduce the emissions of greenhouse
gases, that is, to motivate the development of miti-
gation policy. Yet, we still fall short from being able
to inform policy makers of how high the sea walls
should be in the coastal areas of South America or the
shores of the Cayman Islands.21
In the next three sections, we examine the
reasons behind the apparent disconnect between the
expected potential value of climate predictions and the
reality of inaction in preparing and offsetting impacts
of climate change. We then explore the implications
of this disconnect.
USEFUL, USABLE, AND DESIRABLE
We start by exploring the concepts of useful and usable
and how they influence science, especially climate
projection production and use. In an environment
of high uncertainty and risk, inadequate or no
information, and no or little previous experience, our
ability to predict before we act can be very poor.2,4
Often in these cases, the alternative is to not do
anything, at least until better information develops.
Especially in the case of environmental policy making,
where many of the outcomes are irreversible or
very difficult to correct (e.g., species extinction, lake
eutrophication), inaction can be costly.22
We pose that there are two factors that explain
the disconnection between the perceived usefulness of
climate predictions and their lack of use in decision-
and policy making. First, different actors perceive the
usefulness of scientific information differently. Scien-
tists, for example, when choosing the focus of their
research, may make an assumption of what they think
decision makers need and hope their work will meet
that need. Users, in turn, may define their need differ-
ently. However, scientists and users do not uniformly
make the same assumption about what they think is
useful and what they know is usable. Thus, some sci-
entists’ assumptions may be closer to users’ definition
of need, while others’ may be farther away. In this
sense, there is a range of perceptions of usefulness and
usability. For example, within the Climate Assess-
ment for the Southwest (CLIMAS) funded by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), scientists focused first on the production of
a regional climate forecast tool, which they perceived
as meeting stakeholders’ needs. However, subsequent
interactions with potential users revealed that these
decision makers wanted additional information, in
particular a forecast-evaluation and decision-support
tool. (Refs 23, p. 48, 24, p. 53). In northeast Brazil,
for example, scientists from the state meteorologi-
cal agency believed that the seasonal climate forecasts
(SCFs) they produced would be useful to farmers mak-
ing planting decisions. Agricultural policy makers,
implementing a seed-distribution program, perceived
SCFs as usable when they used the forecasts to issue a
strict planting calendar to which farmers had to abide
in order to have access to the government-distributed
seed. Rain-fed farmers, in contrast, resented SCFs
because they associated their use with a lack of access
to seeds and as a constraint to their planting choices.
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In the farmers’ view, seeds should be available at
the beginning of the season irrespective of climate
predictions and they should be the ones making the
decision of when to plan, not the government.25 Here,
perceptions of usefulness and usability varied across
these different actors and were influenced by different
factors and decision contexts.
While the differentiation between useful and
usable has been characterized in the literature,26 these
two concepts have often been used interchangeably.
We suggest the difference between useful and usable
is a material quality—to borrow from the language
of marketing, usefulness is about functionality and
desirability; usability is about application and fit,
that is, what scientists ideally perceive as useful may
not be applicable or fit decision-making processes
and decision environments in practice. Although
usefulness is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient
to guarantee use. On the basis of empirical evidence
from CLIMAS, Lemos and Morehouse (Ref 27, p. 62)
define usable science as that which ‘directly reflects
expressed constituent needs, should be understandable
to users, should be available at the times and places it
is needed, and should be accessible through the media
available to the user community’. For example, SCFs
are, in principle, useful for farmers since knowing
in advance how much it is likely to rain is a good
thing in agriculture. However, for a subsistence rain-
fed farmer in Africa, with no options in terms of
alternative technologies, it is not usable without
ancillary policy interventions such as access to credit
or to technological innovations.28 SCF forecasts,
however, can be valuable to resource-rich irrigated
farmers in Australia planning their investment for the
following season.29
The second element of the disconnect between
the perceived usefulness of climate predictions and
their lack of use in decision making is that moving
prediction science from useful to usable may depend
on a suite of factors, institutions, and resources includ-
ing (1) technical factors (e.g., information formatting,
timing of release, level of skill); (2) cognitive factors
that influence the way users perceive the science-
generated information (e.g., communication, trust,
credibility, accessibility, experience); (3) institutions
that facilitate or constrain the use of new knowledge;
and (4) structural factors that shape the capacity of
different decision makers to use projections (e.g., lack
of access to knowledge, lack of choice in term of
alternative technologies or policy change).23,24,27,30–35
Recent research suggests that the growing interaction
between climate-projection producers and potential
users can increase their rate of use by decision
makers.27,36 In addition, the creation of boundary
organizations that facilitate the exchange between
knowledge producers and users can also increase
the usability of climate projections.37 For example,
organizations such as the United Kingdom’s Climate
Impacts Program (UKCIP) seek to play a pivotal role
in facilitating the use of knowledge to inform climate-
adaptation action (for example, for numerous reports
and technical papers, see http://www.ukcip.org.uk/).
In this section, we have argued that there is
often a disconnection between what scientists per-
ceive as useful and what decision makers think is
usable. We have also reviewed a few of the conditions
that move predictions across the range of usefulness.
In the next section, we explore different models of
science and policy interaction and lay the ground-
work for exploring the implications of predictions’
inherent uncertainty for decision making, especially in
justifying inaction.
SCIENCE–POLICY INTERACTIONS
Weiss38 proposes two models for the use of scien-
tific research in policy making: the decision- and
the knowledge-driven models. In the decision-driven
model, policy makers, when faced with a problem,
either look for solutions in the pool of pre-existing
research products or commission new research to
meet their needs. In the former, existing research
might be only marginally applicable to the problem
and a certain adjustment is necessary in this model. In
the second model, commissioned research is expected
to have direct application in decision making. In both
cases, science is expected to be readily applicable
to problem solving. In the knowledge-driven model,
such expectation is lower and research is in some
cases ‘used for policy making not so much because
an issue requires elucidation but because research
has uncovered an opportunity that can be capitalized
upon’ (Ref 38, p. 29). Here, the ‘solution’ emerges
first and scientists look for a problem where it can be
applied. Weiss argues that in these cases, the ‘sheer
existence of knowledge presses it toward development
and use’ (p. 30) rather than the other way around.
One consequence is that the emerging solution may
not always fit the problem policy makers want to solve.
For example, although forecast producers have often
expressed their belief that SCFs are useful for man-
aging water resources, water managers often perceive
them as too coarse (i.e., lacking in spatial and temporal
precision) for the kind of decisions they make.31
Evidence from the empirical literature focus-
ing on SCF use suggest that their production and
use has been moving from knowledge- to decision-
driven approaches, as scientists go beyond the physics
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of prediction to engage on research and practice
designed to understand what it takes to make pre-
dictions usable (see the following section for more
detail). This effort has often been carried out by inter-
disciplinary teams of scientists (physical and social)
working together with stakeholders in the context
of integrated assessments and participatory models
of science–policy interaction.27,33 As mentioned in
the previous section, because of greater interaction
between producers and users, the diversity of percep-
tions of what constitutes useful/usable knowledge may
decrease as scientists and decision makers learn about
each other’s work. For example, users may learn of
the difficulties and limitations scientists face regarding
spatial downscaling of climate impacts projections,
while scientists may develop a better understanding
of how users’ decision environments affect their abil-
ity to apply climate projections at several levels of
uncertainty.27 Partly as a result of this interaction,
both scientists and policy makers are increasingly
aware that to solve the potential problems related to
climate impacts, scientific priorities and practices need
to change to include decision support, that is, ‘orga-
nized efforts to produce, disseminate, and facilitate the
use of data and information in order to improve the
quality and efficacy of climate-related decisions’. In
addition, there is growing realization that ‘the infor-
mation that is needed is not only about climate, but
also about changes in social and economic conditions
that interact with climate change and about the state
of knowledge and uncertainty about these phenomena
and interactions’ (Ref 39, p. S1).
CLIMATE PREDICTIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE AND
POLICY
As argued above, part of the difficulty of using climate
projections in decision making can be traced to the
definition and framing of climate change as a problem.
When a problem exists first in the realm of science and
is not readily experienced by the public, the way it gets
inserted in the policy agenda may critically define the
kind of action decision makers take to solve it.22 For
example, it may be difficult to convince current gener-
ations to make sacrifices to save the world for future
ones.22 In this context, the decision to use highly
uncertain scientific knowledge such as climate projec-
tions and SCFs in policy making can be haphazard,
may backfire, and even lead to undesirable outcomes.
On the one hand, application may lead to a period
of ‘new technology blues’,40 that is, when the tribu-
lations of implementing a new technology can result
in its rejection, even before new and better applica-
tions can be uncovered. For example, in northeast
Brazil farmers’ perception that climate forecasts were
‘wrong’, despite the fact that probabilistic forecasts
cannot be deterministically either right or wrong, con-
tributed to the discrediting of not only the forecasts but
also of the forecasters and the agency releasing them as
well.40 On the other hand, undesirable outcomes moti-
vate further adjustment to either get it right or discard
it as a desirable solution. In the best-case scenario,
when this process is carefully monitored and exam-
ined, policy systems learn and adapt accordingly.2,41
In the worst-case scenario, mistakes persist and prop-
agate, and their consequences defy public interest.2
In some instances, policy can be successful even
if decision makers have had little experience in solving
the same kind of problem before, e.g., the ozone layer
hole (for more details, see Ref 42). In others, decision
makers’ lack of experience can limit the action they
are willing to take. Climate change, for example, was
identified by science as a problem before it became a
public policy problem. And partly because neither the
public nor policy makers could experience many of its
negative consequences directly, acting preventively has
been at best challenging and at worst virtually impos-
sible. Sarewitz and Pielke43 have argued that the early
marriage between climate change and science has been
critical in defining climate policy. On the one hand,
pegging climate change to science gave the environ-
mental movement its first impetus to link many of the
problems that they were interested in solving (such
as pollution, loss of forests) to something global and
urgent. On the other hand, it alienated decision makers
because it was a problem outside their experience.43
As a scientific problem, climate change has had a hard
time galvanizing support among the public. This is
in part due to the ‘scientific controversy’ surround-
ing its causes and effects that did little to attract and
accumulate the necessary political capital to back up
unpopular and costly policy to mitigate and prepare
for its negative consequences. For decision makers
reluctant to commit to concrete policies, the uncer-
tainty and controversy in scientific investigation helps
justify their avoidance of difficult decisions, for which
their investment in science becomes a replacement.
Yet, the over-reliance on science may also
sidestep the moral imperative of doing what is right.
The way the climate change problem has been framed
provides the perfect opportunity for policy gridlock,
while ignoring effective action to decrease vulner-
ability to climate impacts.43 Indeed, the technical
‘solution’ may crowd out the moral imperative to
do what is needed to improve livelihoods, conserve
natural resources, and increase the resilience of human
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systems and ecosystems.25,44 In northeast Brazil, for
example, rather than addressing structural deficits at
the heart of vulnerability to drought (e.g., unequal
income and land distribution, lack of education,
health, and political power), local technocrats and
politicians often opted to invest in technical solutions
such as cloud seeding to ‘produce’ rain or SCFs to
respond to drought.25 They did so despite their high
level of uncertainty, because this option was politically
and financially less costly.
Institutional constraints also play a critical role
in the way policy makers make decisions to use
science.30,31,45 Despite the fact that decision mak-
ers frequently make decisions that include hard-to-
predict human behavior,3 they may have difficulty
in extending the same experience to climate change,
because they perceive climate change as physical sci-
ence driven and therefore predictable. Moreover, as
mentioned before, scientists have often expressed their
faith not only in the usefulness of climate predictions
but also in their ability to continuously produce bet-
ter information.46,47 This faith, in turn, might have
encouraged decision makers to believe that a wait-
and-see approach would be reasonable, especially
considering powerful opposition from special interests
(e.g., oil and coal industry) and the lack of political
capital to make tough decisions about climate change
under high levels of uncertainty. Paradoxically, what
decision makers initially may have liked about climate
change as a problem—that it was predictable scientif-
ically—is precisely what now they offer as a reason to
delay action. However, while inaction may be conve-
nient, ‘the argument, that scientific uncertainty must
be resolved before action should be taken, disregards
the fact that no amount of data or theory will be able
to eliminate all uncertainty regarding future temper-
ature changes’ (Ref 2, p. 438). Yet, uncertainty may
become a pretext for inaction, a rationale for self-
serving selection of scientific opinion, or a license to
ignore scientists.2 For example, in the 1990s, indus-
trial interests that became significantly prominent in
the global change debate in the years leading to the
Kyoto Conference used the uncertainty argument to
advocate against ‘policy that would hurt the US’s
economy’.48 In the mid-2000s, the Bush administra-
tion was able to ‘[enlist] an outspoken skeptic of
global warming’ in a fight regarding overseas energy
projects (Kintisch 2005:482 cited by Ref 49).
The level of uncertainty of predictions, however,
is not a fixed quantity that affects all processes
in the same way; different policy decisions can
tolerate different levels of uncertainty. For example,
surprisingly to many, the decision to protect the ozone
layer was achieved relatively quickly and efficiently
despite considerable uncertainty and lack of scientific
consensus.48 As described in the previous section,
there are many kinds of uncertainty and they may
affect the use of predictions in decision making
differently.
Finally, scientists and decision makers have, dif-
ficulty communicating not only about the uncertainty
of predictions34,50–52 but also about whether and how
fast the science behind it would progress to a level deci-
sion makers would perceive as usable.52 Throughout,
climate modelers have persisted in justifying further
funding for prediction research on its potential for
usability.46,53 From the point of view of some natural
scientists, we pose that there is an uncertainty fallacy,
that is, a belief that the systematic reduction of uncer-
tainty in climate projections is required in order for the
projections to be used by decision makers. However,
evidence from the SCF literature (see the following
section) shows that there are many constraints to the
use of SCF in decision making, not all of them related
to the level of uncertainty of the forecasts.32,54,55
Moreover, there is ample evidence that policy mak-
ers and other stakeholders such as farmers often
make decisions under high levels of uncertainty.3,33,56
Figure 1 proposes a framework to think about how
uncertainty affects use and what mediating factors
influence how perceptions of usefulness change.
The top left graph in Figure 1 is from the IPCC-
AR4 and shows the projection of the global surface
warming in the year 2100 for a number of emission
scenarios. It is used to symbolically represent the
products of scientific investigation. There are two
products. The first product is the knowledge that the
Earth will warm. This type of knowledge, which might
be viewed as factual, is easily grasped. The second
outcome of scientific investigation is the uncertainty
associated with that warming projection, which
challenges its factual nature. Hence, the presence of
uncertainty fuels scientific and political arguments.
This is especially true if the uncertainty can be
construed as ‘large’. In this context, action depends
not only on scientific knowledge and the specification
of uncertainty but also on the values and political
calculations of policy makers tasked with responding
to the risks and benefits represented by the warming
of the Earth. It also depends on the customization
of the knowledge to meet decision-makers’ needs,
including knowledge representation, communication,
and contextualization. For some, the knowledge that
the Earth will warm at dangerous levels is compelling
enough that they seek to mitigate the warming
and plan to adapt to the warming. For others, the
uncertainty is large enough that they feel that it is
premature to make a decision until more is known.
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Scientific investigation produces: 
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FIGURE 1 | Knowledge and uncertainty of that knowledge are both products of scientific investigation. Knowledge and uncertainty combine with
values and political will to influence responses. Uncertainty always exists, and in complex problems, new investigation reveals new sources of
uncertainty. Uncertainty reduction is uncommon. Uncertainty can always be used, politically, to fuel selective doubt to disrupt the development of
knowledge-based responses.
Still for others, the uncertainty justifies and supports
their decision to avoid action they did not want to
carry out in the first place. In practice, what these
different interpretations mean is that the uncertainty
surrounding scientific knowledge can always be used
by stakeholders to justify their positions. Thus,
the inevitable uncertainty of knowledge created by
scientific investigation makes up only a part of the
uncertainty of other types of knowledge that inform
decision making.
PREDICTION IN PRACTICE: LESSONS
FROM SCF APPLICATION
In principle, seasonal climate forecasts (SCFs) have
many applications. For the past 15 years, a rich
empirical literature focusing on the use of SCFs in
different sectors in different parts of the developed
and developing worlds has emerged both in the
social and natural sciences.24,32,54,55,57–61 Findings
from this literature suggest that successful application
of SCF tends to follow a systems approach where
SCF is contextualized to the decision situation and
embedded within an array of other information
relevant for risk management. For example, in
Australia, users and producers of SCF have created
knowledge systems for action in which the forecasts
are part of a broader range of knowledge that informs
farmers’ decision making.23 In Arizona, forecast
producers have interacted closely with potential users
to customize information’s formatting, frequency,
and focus.29,30 By contrast, in other cases, evidence
shows that there might be opportunity costs to the
application of forecasts, ranging from the crowding
out of more sustainable and robust alternatives to
actually harming users whose decisions and well-
being forecasts were meant to improve.25,32,62 For
example, in Peru, a forecast of El Niño and the
prospect of a weak season gave fishing companies
incentive to accelerate seasonal layoffs of workers.62
In Zimbabwe, forecast of a bad season resulted in
reduced credit availability and planted areas.63
Seeking to apply the lessons from the SCF
application to inform climate-adaptation policy, more
recent scholarship similarly argues for integration of
predictions within broader decision contexts. These
predictions should take into consideration not just
the magnitude and dimension of exposure to cli-
mate impacts (to which impacts predictions may
be more relevant) but also characterize sensitivities
related to livelihoods, institutions, politics, cultures,
etc.55,58,59,64 Particularly in countries and communi-
ties where lack of resources critically defines vulner-
ability, adaptation policy should not be dependent
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on predictions since capacity building ought to be
precisely about enabling flexible and robust human,
environmental, and physical systems to withstand a
wide range of impact. In these contexts, climate hazard
such as storms, sea level rise, and warmer tempera-
tures make up only one aspect of vulnerability. In
such contexts, integrated assessments and participa-
tory approaches that contextualize the information
to the users’ multiple stresses and needs make more
sense than do ‘perfect’ forecasts. To jump start policy
action, policy makers need ‘plausible representations
of future climate’ that can help them understand
where vulnerabilities lie and what to do to decrease
these vulnerabilities.44 Relative to uncertainty, climate
impacts are only one in a cascade of uncertainties that
aggregate across physical, social, cultural, and politi-
cal factors.65 And climate predictions themselves can
magnify this uncertainty, in that it is impossible to
predict the consequences of human behavior that this
kind of information might motivate.66
Hence, in the context of compounded or
irreducible uncertainty, it seems more sensible to
search for resilient and robust approaches to decision
making that seek to identify strategies that are
less sensitive to wide ranges of uncertainties.52,67,68
For example, 10 years of experience with climate
forecasting application in Africa suggest that
incorporating forecasts within broader sustainability
approaches are likely to produce better results than
isolated attempts to inform action by the use of
forecasts alone.63 Other strategies may include ‘no-
regrets’ or precautionary approaches that allow
for future adjustment as the dimension of climate
impact and response evolve. They may also include
the support of powerful computational resources,
which may not decrease uncertainties but rather
help to better uncover them so that decision makers
‘have better discovery of all issues bearing on the
decision’.4,52 Most importantly, the application of
climate predictions and projections should not crowd
out other approaches that are likely to enhance
the adaptability of people and systems to climate
impact.32 As Hulme and Dessai write
Effective and robust adaptation strategies
are not significantly limited by the absence
of accurate and precise regional climate
predictions. They are limited more by a
multitude of technological, institutional,
cultural, economic and psychological
factors that lie beyond the reach of
climate models—and always will. The
epistemological limits to predicting future
climates with accuracy and precision must
not be used as a reason to limit adaptation
to climate change (Ref 53, p. 979).
We pose Figure 2 as a model for organizing effec-
tive use of climate projections in decision making. As
in Figure 1, the graph represents the products of sci-
entific investigation and the motivation to respond in
the presence of uncertain knowledge. If there is to be
effective response in, for example, building adaptive
capacity, then it is necessary to reduce the problem
at hand to manageable elements. Useful reductions
are aligned along a temporal axis as near term and
long term. Spatially, issues are distinguished between
local and global scales. The third axis is wealth, which
serves to represent several aspects that influence the
problem, ranging from the ability to build adaptive
capacity to issues of environmental justice. When
problems are reduced along these axes, interfaces
between issues can be isolated, and the likelihood
is increased that tensions between competing issues
can be rationalized. Problems at one set of scales can
then be viewed to inform problems at another set
of scales, rather than all problems being conflated.
This approach to problem solving is most likely to
be successful when scientists and stakeholders inter-
act and gain intuitive understanding of the role of
uncertainties in their different communities.
As the reality of climate change as a problem
becomes universally salient, the need for climate-
related policy has risen in many countries’ public
policy agendas. What we do not know about both
physical and social determinants of vulnerability and
adaptive capacity is large. However, what we do know
is enough to jump start action that will allow for
future adjustment and learning, especially if decision
makers and the public weigh the nature and charac-
ter of uncertainty against the likely consequences of
inaction.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed both the sources of
uncertainty in the projections of climate change
and how uncertainty shapes decision making. In
particular, we have explored the gap between the
potential usefulness of climate projections and how
they are used in practice.
Uncertainty is an inherent element of scientific
investigation of climate. In many cases, uncertainties
will get even larger, as scientific investigation will con-
tinue to reveal new sources of uncertainty in models
of a system as complex as that of the Earth’s climate.
Systematic reduction of uncertainty by continued sci-
entific investigation is not, a priori, expected. The
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FIGURE 2 | Climate-change problem solving by reduction of problems along axes of time, spatial scale, and wealth. This reduction enhances
communication between scientists and stakeholders and improves the likelihood of successful problem solving.
emergence of ensemble forecasts as a new technol-
ogy suggests that scientists are seeking to purposefully
manage uncertainties in the forecast system to provide
improved, presumably more usable, forecasts.
Calls for the reduction of uncertainty may be
understandable from both scientists and decision mak-
ers. Some scientists and decision makers such as
water and coastal managers’ statements that better
predictions are necessary are sensible because it is rea-
sonable to expect that improved predictions will lead
to improved usability. Similarly, for those making dif-
ficult decisions with high stakes, it is reasonable to
hope that support from science would streamline the
policy process and clarify decision options. However,
a great deal of what we know of both the production
of scientific knowledge and its application in decision
making suggests that neither process is entirely ratio-
nal or straightforward. In addition, progress in the
science of climate prediction has been slower than both
scientists and decision makers expected and hoped. By
ignoring the complexities of each other’s tasks, both
scientists and policy makers may be denying society
better solutions to the climate change problem.
Part of the disconnection between what decision
makers know they need and what scientists think is
useful may be explained by the way climate change
first became a public policy problem. Because climate
change originally was perceived as a problem by
scientists rather than experienced by society, support
for climate policy has been relatively slow to build.
The gap between how scientists and decision makers
perceive usefulness and usability also contributed to
some decision makers being able to use uncertainty as
a justification to inaction. The high-stakes character
of climate policy and the financial and political costs
associated with effective response amplify this gap and
further invite inaction.
Regarding scientific investigation, we suggest
that there is an uncertainty fallacy, that is, a belief
that systematic reduction of uncertainty will lead
to the development of policy and the rationaliza-
tion of decision making. Aside from ignoring the
intrinsic uncertain character of climate science and
the overall complexity of uncertainty in scientific
investigation, this notion does not recognize how
scientific uncertainty affects the decision-making pro-
cess. Partly because of uncertainty, in the absence of
clear and present danger, those who so wish can sus-
tain their arguments of doubt to justify inaction both
for mitigation and adaptation.
Empirical evidence from the literature on use
of SCFs indicates that beyond uncertainty, many
other factors influence the usability of climate pro-
jections. These include other stressors that shape
the decision-making environment of potential users
(e.g., lack of alternative technologies to respond to
climate projections, lack of resources) as well as issues
of communication, availability, trust, and legitimacy
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of knowledge. To increase the usability of climate
projections, there needs to be collaboration and
interaction between scientists and decision makers,
especially concerning the adoption of a knowledge
systems approach that takes into consideration not
only the decision environment of potential users but
also different ways to manage uncertainty to better
meet their needs.
NOTE
aWhile the term climate projections more closely
reflects current attempts to predict future impacts of
climate change, hereafter we use the more commonly
utilized climate predictions recognizing that the dis-
crepancy between the two terms has itself political
and policy implications.
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